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Compensation Representatives 
A PRUDENT SOLUTION TO EXCESSIVE CEO PAY 
Lawton W. Hawkins† 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The issue of CEO pay continues to garner significant 
attention both in the popular press and among regulators.  The 
New York Times alone printed 339 stories dealing with 
executive compensation in 2006.1  Moreover, the SEC received 
more than twenty thousand comment letters before it approved 
new compensation disclosure rules on July 26, 2006.2  SEC 
Chairman Christopher Cox noted that “no issue in the 72 years 
of the Commission’s history has generated such interest.”3  The 
reason for the intense degree of interest is clear:  CEO 
compensation in the United States is extremely high, and is 
getting higher.  In 2003, the average CEO of a large U.S. firm 
made 500 times the salary of the average worker.4  This 
  
 † Visiting Scholar and Adjunct Professor, University of Washington School of 
Law; J.D., University of Virginia School of Law; B.A., Williams College.  I would like to 
express my thanks for the thoughtful comments and suggestions made by Professors 
Richard Kummert, Todd Zywicki, and Dale Oesterle, as well as the participants at a 
faculty colloquium held at Ohio State University Moritz College of Law.  Needless to 
say, all remaining errors are my own. 
 1 Culled from a January 13, 2007 Westlaw search of the New York Times 
using “ceo or executive w/5 pay or compensation & da(aft 12/31/2005 & bef 
01/01/2007).” 
 2 Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (“SEC”), SEC Votes to Adopt 
Changes to Disclosure Requirements Concerning Executive Compensation and Related 
Matters (July 26, 2006), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006/2006-123.htm [hereinafter 
SEC Press Release].  For the full text of the executive compensation rules, see 
Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, 71 Fed. Reg. 53158 (Sept. 8, 
2006) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229, 232, 239, 240, 245, 249, 274).  See also 
infra notes 89-91 and accompanying text for a brief discussion thereof. 
 3 See SEC Press Release, supra note 2.  
 4 CEOs and Their Indian Rope Trick, ECONOMIST, Dec. 11, 2004, at 61, 
quoted in Stephen M. Bainbridge, Executive Compensation: Who Decides, 83 TEX. L. 
REV. 1615, 1619 (2005); Janice Revell, Mo’ Money, Fewer Problems; Is it a Good Idea to 
Get Rid of the $1 Million CEO Pay Ceiling?, FORTUNE, Mar. 31, 2003, at 34, quoted in 
LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED 
PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 1 (2004) [hereinafter PWP]. 
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compares with 140 times worker salary in 1991.5  In absolute 
levels, the average pay of CEOs in the S&P 500 has risen (in 
constant 2002 dollars) from $3.7 million in 1993 to $9.1 million 
in 2003.6  One study of executive compensation at publicly 
traded firms with a market capitalization larger than $50 
million found that, during the period from 2001 to 2003, these 
firms’ top five executives received compensation equivalent to 
9.8% of the firms’ aggregate earnings.7  
Some commentators have argued that, for the good of 
society, CEOs should not be allowed to receive such exorbitant 
compensation.8  Others take the narrower position that, 
irrespective of the impact on broader society, excessive CEO 
pay clearly harms shareholders.9  Not only must shareholders 
ultimately pay the bill, but to the extent that such pay levels 
are pervasive throughout the market, it becomes difficult for 
them simply to sell the shares of any offending companies.10  
Thus, following the so-called “Wall Street Rule” would force 
investors to exit the entire equity market, an obviously 
untenable response.11   
Still, despite overwhelming evidence that CEO pay is 
extremely high, it does not follow that CEO pay is “excessive.”  
A figure can only be considered excessive if it is higher than the 
“correct” price, and numerous unanswerable questions confront 
anyone attempting to determine the correct price for the 
services of a CEO.12  For example:  How many people actually 
have the necessary skills to be a good CEO?13  How much better 
is a given CEO than the other candidates?14  How much of the 
company’s success or failure is attributable to the CEO?15  
  
 5 PWP, supra note 4, at 1. 
 6 Lucian Bebchuk & Yaniv Grinstein, The Growth of Executive Pay, 21 
OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 283, 285 (2005).  
 7 Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Pay Without Performance: Overview 
of the Issues, 30 J. CORP. L. 647, 652 (2005).  
 8 See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, Executive Compensation: If There’s a Problem, 
What’s the Remedy? The Case for “Compensation Discussion and Analysis,” 30 J. CORP. 
L. 675, (2005); Mark J. Loewenstein, Reflections on Executive Compensation and a 
Modest Proposal for (Further) Reform, 50 SMU L. REV. 201, 206-07 (1996).  
 9  Mark J. Loewenstein, The Conundrum of Executive Compensation, 35 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 25-26 (2000). 
 10  Id. 
 11 Id. 
 12 See Gordon, supra note 8, at 677; Franklin G. Snyder, More Pieces of the 
CEO Compensation Puzzle, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 129, 144-46 (2003). 
 13  Snyder, supra note 12, at 144. 
 14  Id. at 146 
 15  Id. at 145. 
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What is the “fair” allocation of profits as between the CEO and 
the shareholders?16  Does “excessive” refer to an absolute pay 
level, or is pay excessive only if, whatever the amount, it is 
insufficiently tied to actual performance?17  In the face of such 
unanswerable questions, one is left with the market.  In short, 
a fair price for a CEO is the price the market will bear.  But 
one can use the market to legitimize ostensibly excessive CEO 
compensation only if the market is “fair,” in the sense that it 
has not been manipulated by the participants.  
Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried, in their seminal book 
Pay Without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive 
Compensation, condemn CEO pay for just such manipulation.18  
According to Bebchuk and Fried, boards of directors and CEOs 
do not engage in real arm’s length bargaining over CEO pay.19  
Rather, CEOs exert “managerial power” to extract economic 
rents above and beyond what they could have obtained in an 
arm’s length negotiation.20  The result is excessive CEO pay, 
insufficiently aligned with the CEO’s performance.21  To 
address the problem, Bebchuk and Fried propose granting 
shareholders greater power vis-à-vis the board of directors.22  
For example, they would allow large shareholders to nominate 
candidates for the board, and would require the company to 
pick up the expenses for any proxy fight if the shareholder’s 
nominee received more than a designated minimum level of 
support.23   
Bebchuk and Fried’s book has received considerable 
academic attention, with some commentators taking issue with 
its conclusion that CEOs are in fact overpaid,24 and others 
objecting to its proposed remedies.25  This article accepts the 
book’s fundamental point that the CEO pay-setting process is 
flawed and that reforms are necessary.  Nonetheless, it 
recognizes that high CEO pay may be attributable to numerous 
factors other than managerial power, and it questions whether 
  
 16  Id. at 146. 
 17  Without answering this question, I will be using the term “excessive” to 
refer to both scenarios.   
 18 See PWP, supra note 4.  
 19 Id. at 61-64. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. 
 22  Id. at 201-16. 
 23  Id. at 210-12. 
 24  See infra Part III. 
 25  See infra Part IV. 
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certain of Bebchuk and Fried’s proposed solutions might, by 
altering the balance of power between shareholders and 
directors, have unintended negative consequences for matters 
beyond CEO pay.  Therefore, to remedy the process problems 
identified by Bebchuk and Fried, this article suggests that 
shareholders of those corporations with excessive CEO pay can 
and should amend corporate bylaws to enable qualified large 
shareholders to appoint non-executive “compensation 
representatives.”26  Compensation representatives, who would 
have no right to manage the corporation, would look after the 
interests of all shareholders on matters relating exclusively to 
CEO pay.  This article contends that the use of compensation 
representatives could address the most significant problems 
described in Bebchuk and Fried’s book, without fundamentally 
altering the traditional relationship between the shareholders 
and the board of directors.  As such, it would constitute a 
prudent solution to the problem of excessive CEO pay. 
Part II of this article discusses in detail Bebchuk and 
Fried’s thesis, as well as their suggested reforms.  Part III 
describes and evaluates a number of objections to their 
managerial power thesis.  Part IV discusses the many 
objections to Bebchuk and Fried’s proposal to permit large 
shareholders to place board nominees on the corporate ballot.  
Part V introduces the compensation representative approach 
and outlines its numerous advantages over both the current 
system and the reforms suggested by Bebchuk and Fried.  Part 
V addresses the feasibility of the compensation representative 
approach under existing law.  Part VI raises and responds to 
potential objections to the compensation representative 
approach and concludes by demonstrating that adoption of a 
compensation representative system is justified by its low costs 
coupled with its potential benefits to shareholders. 
  
 26  See infra Part V.  
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II. THE MANAGERIAL POWER THESIS 
A. Bebchuk and Fried’s Problems with Current CEO 
Compensation 
1. Factors Enabling CEOs to Exert Managerial Power 
over Compensation 
Ideally, say Bebchuk and Fried, boards and CEOs 
should engage in arm’s length bargaining over CEO 
compensation.27  In such a scenario, boards would vigorously 
negotiate to receive the best deal for the benefit of the 
company’s shareholders.  In fact, argue Bebchuk and Fried, 
CEOs exert managerial power to ensure that their 
compensation is superior to what they would receive in an 
arm’s length bargain.28  Bebchuk and Fried point to five major 
factors that enable CEOs to exert managerial power.  First, 
although most compensation committees are comprised of 
independent directors, CEOs have significant control over who 
will serve on the board from which the committee members will 
be drawn.29  Although exchange rules no longer permit CEOs to 
serve on the nomination committee, a nomination committee is 
unlikely to propose directors opposed by the CEO.30  CEOs are 
not likely to support a critic of high executive pay.31  As long-
time General Electric CEO Jack Welch told an audience of 
recently appointed CEOs: 
Put someone in charge who is nearing the end of their career, so 
they’re not jealous of you as a younger CEO, is immensely rich, 
much richer than you, and enjoys seeing other people get rich. . . .  
Never, ever make a distinguished academic your compensation 
committee chair because you’ll be a poor man by the end of it.32  
Warren Buffett, a long-time critic of excessive CEO pay, had in 
mind a similar tendency when he noted, “Though I have served 
as a director of twenty public companies, only one CEO has put 
  
 27  PWP, supra note 4, at 17-18. 
 28  Id. at 23-44. 
 29  Id. at 26. 
 30  Id. 
 31 Id.  
 32 See Symposium, The Media and Executive Compensation: A Panel 
Discussion, 30  J. CORP. L. 795, 796-97 (2005) (statement quoted by Matthew Bishop). 
454 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:2 
me on his comp[ensation] committee.  Hmmmm . . .”33  Second, 
CEOs are in a position to steer benefits to board members, 
though their ability to do so has been reduced by the 2003 
changes to listing standards of the major securities 
exchanges.34  Third, social and psychological factors discourage 
board members from bargaining aggressively with CEOs over 
compensation.35  Friendship, loyalty, and team spirit encourage 
directors to be pliant, often at the expense of the interests of 
parties, such as shareholders, who are present at the table.36  
Also, board members who are highly paid CEOs in their own 
right are likely to rationalize high CEO pay as being in the best 
interests of shareholders.37  A former SEC commissioner 
described it more nefariously as the “giraffe effect”:   
The compensation committee, composed solely of outside directors 
who were CEOs of their own public corporations, knew that what 
goes around comes around.  Pushing the pay envelope for the CEO 
who had selected them for his board was only natural, since they 
would not want anyone they were associated with to rank in the 
bottom half of surveys, and getting CEOs’ scale up could only help 
them when their scales were reviewed by their outside directors.38  
Fourth, since board members typically own only a very small 
fraction of the company’s stock, and since the reputations of 
directors are unlikely to suffer from approving a CEO’s pay 
package unless the terms of the package are truly egregious, 
directors who comply with CEO pay demands will usually not 
pay a high financial or reputational cost.39  Finally, the limits to 
board members’ time and information all but compel them to 
rely on the advice provided by the company’s human resources 
department and the compensation consultants that have 
traditionally been hired by that department.40  
  
 33 Letter from Warren E. Buffett, Chairman of the Board, Berkshire 
Hathaway, Inc., to the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway, Inc. (Feb. 28, 2006), 
available at http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/2005ltr.pdf. 
 34 PWP, supra note 4, at 27-28. 
 35  Id. at 32. 
 36 Id.  
 37 Id. at 33. 
 38 Bevis Longstreth, A Real World Critique of Pay Without Performance, 30 
J. CORP. L. 767, 769 (2005). 
 39 PWP, supra note 4, at 34-36.  
 40 Id. at 36-37.  As discussed infra text accompanying note 197, New York 
Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) rules now require that a compensation committee’s charter 
give the committee sole power to retain and fire the compensation consultant.  Still, a 
compensation committee will likely make its decision based in part on the 
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2. Existing Mechanisms Cannot Effectively Constrain 
Pay in the Face of Managerial Power 
a. Shareholder Litigation 
Bebchuk and Fried argue that existing mechanisms 
such as litigation, shareholder voting, the labor market, the 
market for corporate control, and the product market, cannot 
effectively constrain pay in the face of managerial power.41  
Litigation’s effectiveness is blunted by both the procedural 
hurdles placed in front of shareholder plaintiffs and the 
extremely high standard applied to challenges to executive 
compensation.42  In order to prevail, plaintiffs in a shareholder 
litigation must establish that either (i) when nominally 
independent directors approved CEO compensation, they were 
in fact engaged in a self-dealing transaction for their own 
personal benefit, or (ii) the compensation scheme constituted 
“waste,” that is, it was so egregious that no rational person 
could have approved it.43   
The difficulty of using shareholder litigation to 
challenge extraordinary pay was recently confirmed in the 
Delaware case In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation.44  In 
Disney, the Delaware Court of Chancery was called upon to 
rule whether Disney directors had breached their fiduciary 
duty when, among other things, they approved an employment 
contract for Michael Ovitz which entitled Ovitz to a ninety 
million dollar severance package after a mere fourteen months 
as President of Disney.45  The court indicated that, prior to 
  
recommendation of the firm’s human resources department, which is ultimately 
responsible to the CEO. 
 41  Id. at 45-65. 
 42 Id. at 45-48. 
 43 Id.  The difficulty of prevailing in a waste claim was colorfully expressed by 
the Delaware Court of Chancery: 
Absent an allegation of fraud or conflict of interest, courts will not review the 
substance of corporate contracts; the waste theory represents a theoretical 
exception to the statement very rarely encountered in the world of real 
transactions. . . .  [R]arest of all—and indeed, like Nessie, possibly non-
existent—would be the case of disinterested business people making non-
fraudulent deals (non-negligently) that meet the legal standard of waste! 
Steiner v. Meyerson, No. 13139, 1995 Del. Ch. LEXIS 95, at *13-14 (Del. Ch. July 18, 
1995). 
 44 No. Civ. A. 15452, 2005 WL 2056651 (Del. Ch. Aug. 09, 2005), aff’d, No. 
411, 2006 WL 1562466 (Del. June 8, 2006). 
 45 Id. at *25. 
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Ovitz’s termination, “the Disney board had never met in order 
to vote on, or even discuss, the termination at a full 
session . . . .  [T]he Disney directors had been taken for a wild 
ride, and most of it was in the dark.”46  In describing the 
boardroom culture at Disney, the court wrote of “how 
ornamental, passive directors contribute to sycophantic 
tendencies among directors and how imperial CEOs can exploit 
this condition for their own benefit, especially in the executive 
compensation and severance area.”47  It described CEO Michael 
Eisner’s relationship with other board members as follows: 
By virtue of [Eisner’s] Machiavellian (and imperial) nature as CEO, 
and his control over Ovitz’s hiring in particular, Eisner to a large 
extent is responsible for the failings in process that infected and 
handicapped the board’s decisionmaking abilities.  Eisner stacked 
his (and I intentionally write “his” as opposed to “the Company’s”) 
board of directors with friends and acquaintances who . . . were 
certainly more willing to accede to his wishes and support him 
unconditionally than truly independent directors.48  
Nonetheless, despite board conduct that contained “many 
lessons on what not to do,”49 the Court of Chancery held, in a 
decision affirmed by the Delaware Supreme Court,50 that the 
Disney directors had not violated their fiduciary duties.51 
b. Shareholder Voting 
If litigation provides no real constraint on excessive 
compensation, what about shareholder voting?  Bebchuk and 
Fried argue that it too is inadequate in the face of managerial 
power.52  It is true that in certain instances, such as the 
adoption of a stock option plan, the major exchanges’ listing 
rules require that a corporation submit the plan to a 
shareholder vote.53  However, the vote does not effectively 
  
 46  Id.  
 47 Id. at *28 n.373. 
 48 Id. at *40 (internal citation omitted). 
 49 Id. at *39 (emphasis added). 
 50 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 2006 WL 1562466, at *33-34. 
 51  In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 2005 WL 2056651. 
 52 PWP, supra note 4, at 48-51. 
 53 See, e.g., NASDAQ Rule 4350(i) (2006); NYSE Listed Company Manual 
303A.08, http://www.nyse.com/lcm (follow the “Click here to open the NYSE Listed 
Company Manual” hyperlink, the “Section” hyperlink, the “Section 3 Corporate 
Responsibility” hyperlink, the “Section 303A Corporate Governance Standards” 
hyperlink, and the “Section 303A.08 Shareholder Approval of Equity Compensation 
Plans” hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 8, 2006). 
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constrain CEO compensation since it concerns only general 
matters, such as the total number of options that may be 
issued under the plan, rather than the compensation of any 
particular executive.54  It is also true that Section 162(m) of the 
Internal Revenue Code disallows deductions for compensation 
exceeding $1 million per executive unless it is “performance 
based.”55  One of the requirements for “performance based” 
compensation is that the material terms of the excess amount 
over $1 million be approved by a majority of the shareholders 
in a separate vote.56  However, even if shareholders are 
knowledgeable enough to vote intelligently on compensation 
issues,57 they are constrained by the fact that they are not 
presented with any alternative to the plan approved and 
proposed by the board.58  Therefore, if the shareholders were to 
reject the board’s plan before an alternative became available, 
senior management could resign and throw the company into 
crisis.59  To prevent this, a board might simply pay executives 
the cash equivalent of the rejected plan, since the exchange 
rules do not require a shareholder vote on cash compensation.60  
That result could make shareholders even worse off, since cash 
payments would not necessarily be linked to performance of the 
stock price.  If shareholders did not approve the compensation, 
it would not be deemed “performance based,” and amounts over 
$1 million would not be tax deductible.61  
c. “Outrage Costs” and “Camouflage” 
In addition to arguing that litigation and shareholder 
voting cannot effectively constrain CEO pay, Bebchuk and 
Fried assert that neither the labor market, the market for 
corporate control, the capital market, nor the product market 
  
 
 54 PWP, supra note 4, at 49.  See also Developments in the Law—Corporations 
and Society,  117 HARV. L. REV. 2169, 2213 (2004). 
 55 I.R.C. § 162(m) (2006). 
 56 Id.  
 57 This is not always a valid assumption, given the complexity of the 
documents and the frequent need to tailor the details of the compensation plan to the 
specifics of the particular industry.  See Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, The 
Effect of Shareholder Proposals on Executive Compensation, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 1021, 
1033-34 (1999). 
 58  PWP, supra note 4, at 49. 
 59  Id. 
 60  Id. at 49-50. 
 61 Id. 
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constrains executive pay.62  Thus, the only remaining restraints 
on inappropriate compensation are “outrage costs,” which 
Bebchuk and Fried define as outsiders’ negative reactions to 
unjustified, abusive, or egregious pay practices.63  Even outrage 
costs can be rendered ineffective, since companies endeavour to 
camouflage the extent and form of their compensation.   
Because perceptions are so important, the designers of compensation 
plans can limit outside criticism and outrage by dressing, packaging, 
or hiding—in short camouflaging—rent extraction. . . .  [M]anagers 
will prefer compensation practices that obscure the total amount of 
compensation, that appear to be more performance based than they 
actually are, and that package pay in ways that make it easier to 
justify and defend.64  
Indeed, the very fact that CEOs feel the need to camouflage 
their pay (as is not the case with movie stars, athletes, and 
other highly paid stars) strongly suggests to Bebchuk and 
Fried that most compensation packages are not arrived at by 
arm’s length negotiation.65 
Examples of camouflage cited by Bebchuk and Fried 
include: long-time managerial resistance to the expensing of 
options;66 the widespread use of tax-inefficient supplemental 
executive retirement plans or “SERPs,” which do not enable the 
company to reap tax benefits, but may allow CEOs to reap 
camouflage benefits;67 deferred compensation arrangements, 
which permit the CEO to enjoy an undisclosed, above-market 
rate of return prior to vesting;68 and post-retirement perks and 
consulting compensation, which need not be disclosed because 
the recipient is no longer CEO at the time he receives the 
benefits.69  For example, Bebchuk and Robert Jackson 
conducted a study of the pension plans among the CEOs of the 
Fortune 500 who either retired during 2003 or the first five 
months of 2004, or were at or close to retirement age in 2004.70  
Although the companies were not required to disclose the total 
  
 62 Id.  
 63 Id. at 65. 
 64 PWP, supra note 4, at 67. 
 65 Id. at 21.  
 66 Id. at 150. 
 67 Id. at 97-100. 
 68 Id. at 105. 
 69 Id. at 110. 
 70 Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Executive Pensions, 30 J. 
CORP. L. 823, 826 (2005). 
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costs of such plans to shareholders,71 they were required to 
disclose the existence of the plans and the method for 
determining the annual benefit.72  Only by examining each 
company’s proxy materials, 8-K filings, and CEO employment 
contract, as well as by estimating the likely payout by taking 
into account factors such as each CEO’s tenure at the company, 
age, and expected life span, were the authors able to estimate 
the costs of such plans to shareholders.73  They found that, for 
recently retired CEOs, the average cost exceeded $21 million, 
and for incumbent CEOs between the ages of sixty-three and 
sixty-seven, the average cost exceeded $26 million.74  
According to Bebchuk and Fried, unrestrained 
managerial power, coupled with camouflage, leads to “pay 
without performance,” in which CEOs enjoy extraordinarily 
high pay irrespective of whether they increase shareholder 
value.75  For example, CEOs of companies in the S&P 500 
averaged $2 million in cash salary and bonus in 2002, but the 
variation in cash pay among the CEOs was not correlated to 
performance relative to their respective industries.76  Although 
option grants were meant to overcome the alignment problems 
found in cash compensation, Bebchuk and Fried point out that 
standard, non-indexed, at-the-money option grants77 often 
provide CEOs with windfall benefits.78  After all, the rise in a 
  
 71 Id. at 828.  New rules approved in July 2006 will require companies to 
include a pension benefits table disclosing the actuarial present value of each of the 
accumulated benefits under each pension plan of the CEO and other designated 
executives.  See supra note 2. 
 72 Bebchuk & Jackson,  supra note 70, at 828. 
 73  Id. 
 74 Id. at 837-38. 
 75  Id. at 831. 
 76 PWP, supra note 4, at 122-23. 
 77 In a standard, non-indexed, at-the-money grant, the CEO receives the 
option at any time during a designated period (typically ten years) to purchase shares 
of the company at the market price (known as the “exercise” or “strike” price) 
prevailing as of the date of the grant.  Thus, for example, if the CEO received 100 
options at an exercise price of $20 and five years later, he or she exercised the option 
when the market price for the stock was $40, the CEO would reap a benefit of ($40-
$20) x 100, or $2,000.  An “in-the-money” option would set the exercise price below the 
market price on the date of the grant, while an “out-of-the-money” option would set the 
exercise price above the market price on the grant date.  If the option were indexed, 
then the exercise price would rise or fall in tandem with a specific index, such as the 
S&P 500.  In the foregoing example, assuming that the option was indexed to the S&P, 
and the S&P increased 50% over the five-year period, the exercise price would also rise 
50% to $30.  The CEO’s gain on exercise would be reduced to ($40-$30) x 100, or $1,000.  
See THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF MODERN FINANCE 83-89 (1992) (defining and 
discussing “option pricing theory”). 
 78  PWP, supra note 4.  
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given company’s stock may simply be part of a general rise in 
the market, resulting from the mere passage of time, or from 
circumstances beyond the CEO’s control, such as a reduction in 
interest rates.79  Although boards could solve much of the 
windfall problem by “indexing” options so that the exercise 
price would rise or fall in tandem with a given index, such as 
the S&P 500, indexed options are rare—a fact that Bebchuk 
and Fried view as further support for the managerial power 
thesis.80  And while boards do not index options upward, they 
do often re-price them downward when the shares drop deeply 
out of the money, essentially providing CEOs with a gift, 
despite the poor performance of the company’s shares.81   
An even more egregious practice, which has come to 
light since the publication of Bebchuk and Fried’s book, has 
been the widespread use of backdated options, particularly, 
though by no means exclusively, among high technology 
  
 79 Id. at 138-39.  Warren Buffett has pointed out another method by which 
CEOs can ensure that, over time, the value of un-indexed stock options will increase—
consistently withholding dividends and buying back company stock.  Buffett imagines a 
Company called Stagnant Corporation, which has granted a ten year, at-the-money 
option to its CEO, Fred Futile, to purchase 1% of the company.  During the ten year 
period Stagnant Corporation enjoys no growth, each year earning $1 billion on $10 
billion net assets, equal to $10 per share on each of its outstanding 100 million shares.  
If, rather than paying any dividends, Fred uses the $1 billion to repurchase shares, and 
the shares continue to sell at 10 times earnings, the shares will have appreciated 158% 
over the ten years.  “That’s because repurchases would reduce the number of shares to 
38.7 million by that time and earnings per share would therefore increase to $25.80.  
Simply by withholding earnings from owners, Fred gets very rich, making a cool $158 
million, despite the business itself improving not at all.”  Letter from Warren E. Buffett 
to the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway, Inc., supra note 33, at 16. 
 80 PWP, supra note 4, at 141-43.  There may be good reasons, however, not to 
index option grants.  For example, suppose Company A’s board indexed CEO options to 
the movement of the S&P 500.  If the S&P dropped 10% while Company A shares 
stayed flat, shareholders might complain that Company A’s CEO is being unfairly 
rewarded for the fall in the price of other shares.  Or imagine the CEO of Big Oil, Inc.  
As a result of rising oil prices, the S&P plummets as Big shares rise spectacularly. 
Big’s CEO would be doubly rewarded for events beyond his control.  In order to avoid 
the problem of sectors whose stocks move counter to a broad index, Big’s stock options 
could be tied to the “energy sector.”  But defining the sector could be difficult, and it 
could open the way to manipulation ex ante.  Query: was Enron in energy or financial 
services?  If, in order to avoid definitional problems, Big indexed options to the stock of 
a few companies  in its peer group, the pay to Big’s CEO could vary wildly simply as a 
result of a large scandal at, or a large windfall to, a competitor.  Even a perfectly 
designed index could present new problems.  Saul Levmore has suggested that 
indexing options might encourage CEOs to take on excessively risky projects, since 
they will receive the same payout (zero) from their options whether they index returns 
or take a big risk that fails spectacularly, but will receive a huge payoff if their gamble 
succeeds. Saul Levmore, Puzzling Stock Options and Compensation Norms, 149 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1901, 1922-23 (2001). 
 81 PWP, supra note 4, at 165-67. 
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companies.82  Options granted on a given date are made 
effective retroactively, as of a date when the stock price was 
lower.83  This decreases the exercise price of the option and 
enables executives to reap a larger benefit from the option 
grant.  Despite the claim that stock option grants incentivize 
executives to increase the company’s stock price in the future, 
backdating rewards executives merely for short term volatility 
in the recent past.84  SEC investigations into the practice have 
only just begun, but one academic study using statistical 
analysis of 7,774 companies’ stock option grants between 1996 
and 2005 has found that an estimated 29.2%, or 2,270 
companies, manipulated stock grants at some point.85  Even in 
those companies that do not engage in backdating, Bebchuk 
and Fried point out that CEOs can often blunt the risks (and 
alignment of interests) associated with stock options by selling 
their shares promptly upon exercise of the underlying options 
or by hedging against the performance of the shares, thereby 
protecting themselves against a future drop in the company’s 
stock price.86  In short, Bebchuk and Fried make a persuasive 
case that, as a result of managerial power, executive pay is 
both higher and less aligned with shareholder interests than it 
would be if it were determined by arm’s length bargaining, and 
they demonstrate the current difficulty facing those who would 
challenge objectionable pay arrangements.  
B. Bebchuk and Fried’s Proposed Solutions 
Bebchuk and Fried indicate that their primary goal is to 
call attention to the problem of executive compensation, rather 
than to propose solutions.87  Nonetheless, they do suggest 
several specific reforms.  First, they advocate steps to enhance 
transparency, such as expensing options, placing a monetary 
value on all compensation, and disclosing what fraction of 
executives’ option gains resulted from performance that was 
  
 82  Eric Dash, Study Finds Outside Directors Also Got Backdated Options, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2006, at C2. 
 83 Floyd Norris, S.E.C. Clarifies Accounting for Backdated Options, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sep. 20, 2006, at C7. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Randall A. Heron & Erik Lie, What Fraction of Stock Option Grants to Top 
Executives Have Been Backdated or Manipulated?, ___ J. FIN. ECON. (forthcoming 
2007) (on file with author). 
 86 PWP, supra note 4, at 176-79.  
 87 Id. at 189. 
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superior to that of its industry peers.88  These suggestions are 
relatively uncontroversial; several have already been 
implemented.  For example, since fiscal year 2006, companies 
have been required to expense employee stock option grants.89  
Furthermore, the newly-approved disclosure rules, to be 
effective December 15, 2006, will require companies to disclose 
in tabular form the actuarial present value of the accumulated 
benefits under each pension plan of the CEO and other 
designated executives.90  Indeed, the new rules include an 
additional reform not mentioned by Bebchuk and Fried: the 
requirement that the company insert into the proxy statement 
a “compensation discussion and analysis” statement, written in 
plain English and signed by the CEO and Chief Financial 
Officer.91 
Disclosure alone will not solve what is arguably the 
most significant problem in the pay-setting process—the 
board’s lack of accountability to the shareholders.  Therefore, 
Bebchuk and Fried advocate strengthening the influence of 
shareholders in three ways.  First, they would require 
companies to obtain specific shareholders’ approval for certain 
“suspect” forms of compensation, such as non-indexed options, 
re-priced options, and large severance payments.92  Second, 
they would grant shareholders more say in the appointment 
and reappointment of directors.93  Currently, while 
shareholders have the right to elect directors, nominations for 
directorships of a publicly-traded company are made, not by 
the shareholders, but by the nomination committee of the 
board itself.94   
Bebchuk and Fried would permit any shareholder who 
for one year has held, say, five percent of the shares to gain 
  
 88 Id. at 192-94. 
 89 Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 107, 70 Fed. Reg. 16693 (Apr. 1, 2005) 
(codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 211). 
 90 Executive Compensation and Related Party Disclosure, 71 Fed. Reg. 6542, 
6611-12 (Feb. 8, 2006) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229.402(c), 228.402(c), 229.10). 
 91 Executive Compensation and Related Party Disclosure, 71 Fed. Reg. 6611 
(Feb. 8, 2006) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 229.402(b)). 
 92 PWP, supra note 4, at 195-98. 
 93 Id. at 195-96. 
 94 See NYSE Listed Company Manual 303A.00, http://www.nyse.com/lcm 
(follow the “Click here to open the NYSE Listed Company Manual” hyperlink, the 
“Section” hyperlink, the “Section 3 Corporate Responsibility” hyperlink, the “Section 
303A Corporate Governance Standards” hyperlink, and the “Section 303A.04 
Nominating/Corporate Governance Committee” hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 8, 2006). 
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access to the corporate ballot for board elections.95  Instead of 
the existing rule, which requires a shareholder to pay its own 
costs in any proxy fight,96 Bebchuk and Fried would require the 
company to cover the costs of proxy campaigns that garner 
significant support.97  Third, Bebchuk and Fried would give 
shareholders the power to initiate changes to the corporate 
charter.98  
III. OBJECTIONS TO THE MANAGERIAL POWER THESIS 
The managerial power thesis has drawn considerable 
criticism among commentators.  Some have claimed that CEO 
pay in the United States is not in fact excessive, but that high 
CEO compensation is justified by the size and complexity of 
large organizations.99  For example, one commentator has 
pointed out that asset managers, who seem to have less 
complex duties than CEOs, typically receive a higher 
percentage of “assets under management” than CEOs, even 
after accounting for the asset managers’ costs of doing 
business.100  Surely, he argues, CEOs are entitled to pay on par 
with that of asset managers.101  As for international 
comparisons,102 one commentator has posited four possible 
explanations for the relatively high pay of U.S. CEOs:103  
(i) U.S. CEOs contribute more to their firms’ value than do 
foreign CEOs; (ii) the tournament to become a U.S. CEO is 
  
 95  PWP, supra note 4 at 197-98. 
 96 Currently, Rule 14a-8, pursuant to which a shareholder can shift the costs 
of a proxy proposal by compelling a corporation to place it on the corporate proxy, is not 
available for disputes over the election of particular board members.  See 17 C.F.R. § 
240.14a-8 (2005).  See infra notes 166-74 and accompanying text for further discussion 
of Rule 14a-8.  
 97 PWP, supra note 4, at 210-11. 
 98 Id. at 212-13.  Bebchuk and Fried also suggest that companies should link 
CEO pay more closely to performance by indexing options, limiting executives’ ability 
to unwind holdings, and avoiding “soft landings” in which unsuccessful CEOs are given 
generous severance payments upon departure.  Id. at 190-91.  
 99 Joseph E. Bachelder, Comments on Pay Without Performance, 30 J. CORP. 
L. 777, 781-82 (2005). 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id.  
 102 The international compensation differential may be shrinking.  See 
Geraldine Fabrikant, U.S.-Style Pay Deals for Chiefs Become All the Rage in Europe, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2006, at A1 (noting that the differential between U.S. and 
European CEOs is declining as European CEOs demand pay in line with that of their 
U.S. counterparts). 
 103 Randall S. Thomas, Explaining the International CEO Pay Gap: Board 
Capture or Market Driven?, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1171, 1176-80 (2004). 
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bigger, due to the greater power U.S. CEOs wield compared to 
their foreign counterparts; (iii) U.S. executives are more mobile 
and can change companies in order to receive higher pay; (iv) 
the presence of poison pills and the absence of control 
shareholders in U.S. companies has shifted bargaining power 
to management.104   
Other commentators have argued that even if CEO pay 
is high, it can nonetheless be justified since, over time, U.S. 
shares have performed better than those of markets where 
CEOs are paid less.105  Certainly, rational shareholders would 
prefer to pay an extra $1 million to CEOs if that would lead to 
an additional shareholder return in excess of $1 million. 
Still other commentators have attempted to refute the 
managerial power thesis by pointing out that increased CEO 
pay is part of the larger labor market phenomenon known as 
the “superstar effect.”  The superstar effect takes hold in 
markets where, as a result of the large scale of an organization, 
even small differences in the quality of those responsible for 
the organization’s success can have extremely large impact on 
the organization’s results.  This leads to dramatic increases in 
the compensation at the top of such organizations.106  Various 
types of stars, other than CEOs, have been enjoying large pay 
increases as the scales of their organizations have increased 
over time.  For example, professional baseball players have 
been receiving significantly higher pay as the amount of money 
in professional baseball has been increasing, even though 
baseball players cannot manipulate the negotiation process.107  
Similarly, as corporations get larger, such that even slightly 
better management can cause a dramatic increase in total 
shareholder value, one could expect that CEO pay would rise as 
well, whether or not CEOs exert managerial power.108  And 
indeed a recent empirical study of CEO compensation at S&P 
500 companies between the years 1980 and 2003 has argued 
that the six-fold increase in CEO pay during that period can be 
explained by the six-fold increase in the asset value of the 
  
 104 Id. 
 105 John E. Core et al., Is U.S. CEO Compensation Inefficient Pay Without 
Performance?, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1142, 1165-66 (2005); Ira T. Kay, CEO Pay for 
Performance: The Solution to “Managerial Power,” 30 J. CORP. L. 785 (2005). 
 106  See generally Sherwin Rosen, The Economics of Superstars, 71 AM. ECON. 
REV. 845 (1981).  
 107 Snyder, supra note 12, at 155-59. 
 108 R. Glenn Hubbard, Pay Without Performance: A Market Equilibrium 
Critique, 30 J. CORP. L. 717, 718 (2005). 
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companies in the S&P 500 over the same period.109  While the 
mere fact that recent increases in CEO pay have tracked 
increases in company size does not prove that current pay 
levels are appropriate,110 it does suggest that not all of the 
increases in CEO pay can be attributed to managerial power. 
Bebchuk and Fried have also been faulted for failing to 
distinguish between the legitimate bargaining power of 
talented people and the illegitimate manipulation of the 
negotiation process.111  One study of CEO compensation during 
the years 1992 to 2000 indicated that externally hired CEOs, 
who do not tend to have power over the existing board, made on 
average ninety-six percent more compensation than CEOs 
hired from within the corporation.112  This finding implies that 
the high salaries of outsiders result from their strong, but 
legitimate, bargaining power.113     
Other commentators concede that boards and CEOs do 
not engage in idealized arm’s length bargaining over CEO 
salaries, but deny that the arm’s length negotiation model is 
the correct standard by which to judge the negotiations.114  
They claim that the relationship between the CEO and the 
board (or company) would be best described as a long term 
  
 109  Xavier Gabaix & Augustin Landier, Why Has CEO Pay Increased So 
Much? (MIT Dep’t of Econ. Working Paper No. 06-13, 2006), available at http://www. 
ssrn.com/abstract=901826. 
 110  For one thing, it is not clear that the pay levels in 1980 were themselves 
appropriate.  For another, it seems implausible that running a 2003 sized corporation 
requires six times the effort that it did to run a 1980 sized corporation.  And even 
assuming that a CEO is entitled to more pay for running a larger company, one might 
expect that as companies grow larger, CEOs would be called upon to offer “volume 
discounts” as other commercial actors do, in which case pay, as a percentage of assets 
at least, would have decreased since 1980. 
 111 Snyder, supra note 12, at 152-55. 
 112 Kevin J. Murphy, Explaining Executive Compensation: Managerial Power 
Versus the Perceived Cost of Stock Options, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 847, 853-54 (2002). 
 113 Bebchuk and Fried attempt to address this point by arguing that the 
directors would still have a strong incentive to please the new externally-hired CEO, 
since he or she would have influence over the director’s re-election prospects.  The 
directors may also be disinclined to bargain with the CEO candidate over pay, since 
they “want to get things off to a pleasant start.”  PWP, supra note 4, at 40.  Yet this 
hardly explains why the pay of externally hired CEOs would be higher than that of 
internal hires.  A better argument might begin by pointing out that managerial power 
distorts the market price for all CEOs.  Since an externally hired CEO is often either 
the CEO of another firm or an executive who has the possibility of one day becoming 
CEO, a firm wishing to hire externally would need to compensate the candidate for the 
forgone opportunities in his current role.  In that sense, externally hired CEOs may be 
indirect beneficiaries of the widespread exercise of managerial power in the market for 
CEOs generally.   
 114 See, e.g., Longstreth, supra note 38, at 767-68; Snyder, supra note 12, at 
149-52.  
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relational contract.115  In such contracts, parties tend not to 
fight for every advantage, but recognize that a given 
negotiation is only part of a broader relationship.   
The directors’ perception that they should support the CEO, their 
reluctance to override substantive decisions except under unusual 
circumstances, and their desire to be part of the “team” are not 
necessarily abdications of authority but may instead reflect the 
board’s view that the long-term interest of the corporation is 
furthered by cooperation and team-building.116 
As a senior consultant and former board member of Teachers 
Insurance and Annuity Association-College Retirement 
Equities Fund (TIAA-CREF) succinctly put it, “[b]oards have to 
be tough.  They have to be collegial at the same time, 
though.”117  Or, to use the words of a former SEC 
Commissioner, “[m]oney may be ‘left on the table.’  And, yet, 
the best interests of shareholders may have been served.”118  If, 
instead, a board adopted an overly adversarial attitude towards 
the CEO, the costs to shareholder returns could outweigh any 
benefits arising from robust CEO pay negotiations.  For 
example, the CEO could simply withhold information from 
board members he or she considered hostile, thereby rendering 
the board less effective.119   
Turning to the specific pay practices criticized by 
Bebchuk and Fried, such as non-indexed at-the-money options, 
Kevin Murphy claims that there is a better explanation than 
managerial power for their widespread adoption.120  Boards 
may simply have considered such options a “cheap” form of 
compensation, since they require no immediate cash outlay 
and, until recently, they did not need to be treated as an 
expense for accounting purposes.121  On the other hand, risk 
averse and undiversified managers discount the value of high 
  
 115  Snyder, supra note 12, at 149.  
 116 Id. at 151.  See also Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of 
Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the Unintended Consequences of Independence and 
Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797, 810 (2001) (suggesting that collegiality is necessary to 
enable mutual commitment and to make consensus-reaching practical). 
 117 Kenneth West, Pay Without Performance: An Executive’s Perspective, 30 J. 
CORP. L. 791, 792 (2005). 
 118 Longstreth, supra note 38, at 768. 
 119  See Bengt Holmstrom, Pay Without Performance and the Managerial 
Power Hypothesis: A Comment, 30 J. CORP. L. 703, 711-12 (2005). 
 120  Murphy, supra note 112, at 859-60 
 121 Id. 
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risk options, and demand large option grants in lieu of cash.122  
In short, boards’ and managers’ respective assessments of the 
cost and value of such options may explain their increased use 
better than does managerial power alone.123  As evidence of 
this, one study found “that nearly 80% of [the] options granted 
in S&P 500 Industrials, S&P 500 Financials, and New 
Economy firms in 2000 were granted to executives and 
employees below the top five,” presumably employees without 
significant power over the board.124  Thus, critics of Bebchuk 
and Fried have countered the managerial power thesis with a 
variety of plausible arguments.  
IV. REACTIONS TO BEBCHUK AND FRIED’S PROPOSED 
REFORMS  
Given the controversy surrounding Bebchuk and Fried’s 
diagnosis of the problem of CEO pay, one could expect similar 
reactions to their proposed solutions.  In fact, as described  in 
this part, while commentators have not objected to their 
proposals to increase transparency, they have raised numerous 
objections to their proposals to allow shareholders to appoint 
nominees to the board and to initiate changes to the corporate 
charter.  Critics have pointed out that institutional 
shareholders are often unwilling to become engaged in the 
internal matters of corporations in which they invest, since 
their costs in time and liquidity would likely exceed the 
expected benefits.125  Rational institutional investors would 
rather sell the shares of companies that destroy shareholder 
value (either through inappropriate payment practices or 
otherwise) than hold on to under-performing shares long 
enough to effect the necessary improvements.126  
Moreover, commentators note, one cannot assume that 
those shareholders who are willing to become engaged in 
corporate governance issues will necessarily promote the 
financial interests of all the corporation’s shareholders.  
  
 122 Id. at 859. 
 123  Id. at 857. 
 124 Id.  
 125 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder 
Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1751-52 (2006). 
 126 Id.  See also Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder 
Voting Rights, 53 UCLA L. REV. 601, 629-33 (2006); Olin Kramer, Pay Without 
Performance: The Institutional Shareholder Perspective, 30 J. CORP. L. 773, 774-75 
(2005); Thomas & Martin, supra note 57, at 1034. 
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Delaware Vice Chancellor Strine makes the point as follows:  
“Those institutions most inclined to be activist investors are 
associated with state governments and labor unions, and often 
appear to be driven by concerns other than a desire to increase 
the economic performance of the companies in which they 
invest.”127  For example, a large union pension fund might 
threaten to mount a proxy fight for the election of board 
members who would accede to the union’s wage demands.  
Indeed, some have argued that such a scenario was at the 
heart of the decision by California Public Employees’ 
Retirement System (“CalPERS”) (a former president of which 
was the regional director of the United Food and Commercial 
Workers) to withhold support for the election of the Safeway 
CEO, following a strike at Safeway.128 
Commentators have also pointed out that, even 
assuming shareholders do not pursue non-economic agendas, 
differing types of shareholders could have widely divergent 
interests.129  For example, a hedge fund with a short term 
investment horizon might clamour for policies that sacrifice 
long term interests for short term gain.130  Similarly, diversified 
shareholders (who have eliminated firm-specific risk) might 
advocate the implementation of projects that undiversified 
shareholders would consider to be too risky.131  Companies 
generally attempt to reconcile these divergent interests by 
placing the authority to make decisions on behalf of the 
corporation into the hands of the board of directors.132  Courts 
facilitate this centralization of authority when they apply the 
business judgment rule133 to insulate most board decisions from 
  
 127 Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward a True Corporate Republic: A Traditionalist 
Response to Bebchuk’s Solution for Improving Corporate America, 119 HARV. L. REV. 
1759, 1765 (2006); see also Bainbridge, supra note 125, at 1754-55. 
 128 Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 
UCLA L. REV. 561, 590 (2006). 
 129 Id. 
 130 Id. at 591. 
 131 Id. at 577-92. 
 132 Michael P. Dooley, Two Models of Corporate Governance, 47 BUS. LAW. 
461, 468 (1992). 
 133 The business judgment rule has been characterized by the Delaware 
Supreme Court as “a presumption that in making a business decision, the directors of a 
corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the 
action taken was in the best interests of the company.”  Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 
A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)).  
Absent a showing of fraud, overreaching, lack of good faith, or being uninformed, a 
court will defer to the business judgment of the directors, and will not substitute its 
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shareholder challenge.134  Granting shareholders greater power 
might enhance the board’s accountability, but only at a cost to 
board authority.135  To exacerbate matters, Bebchuk and Fried’s 
proposal could make directors more accountable, not to 
shareholders generally, but simply to those shareholders that 
attempted to assert their newfound power.  As demonstrated 
above, there is no guarantee that the assertive shareholders’ 
interests are always aligned with those of other shareholders.136  
In short, commentators have pointed out that Bebchuk and 
Fried’s proposed reforms could entail great costs.  Thus, they 
should only be undertaken if they would bring shareholders 
even greater benefits.  
Turning to the putative benefits of Bebchuk and Fried’s 
proposed reforms, critics have argued that they would be 
rather small in comparison to the costs described above.  After 
all, they argue, there is evidence that despite the absolute size 
of CEO pay, the amounts involved may not be material to 
  
judgment for that of the board.  See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 
958 (Del. 1985).  
 134 See Dooley, supra note 132. 
The business judgment rule can only be understood as intended to protect the 
authority of the board and thus to promote the value of Authority. . . .  [T]he 
power to hold a party accountable is the power to interfere and, ultimately, 
the power to decide.  Thus, affording shareholders the right to demand 
frequent judicial review of board decisions has the effect of transferring 
decision-making authority from the board to the shareholders. 
Id. at 470. 
 135 Stephen Bainbridge describes the dichotomy between authority and 
accountability as follows:  
A complete theory of corporate governance . . . requires balancing the virtues 
of discretionary fiat against the need to ensure that such power is used to 
further the interests of shareholders.  Because the power to hold to account 
differs only in degree and not in kind from the power to decide, fiat and 
accountability also are antithetical. 
Bainbridge, supra note 125, at 1747 (internal citations omitted).  Or, as he states 
elsewhere in the same article: “[T]here are limits on one’s ability to reduce agency costs 
without undermining the centralization of fiat that makes the modern corporation 
work.”  Id. at 1741. 
 136 Commentators have pointed out a number of other unintended 
consequences that might arise if shareholders had the power to nominate board 
members.  For example, perfectly independent board members who significantly 
improve compensation practices might nonetheless be unqualified to fulfil other more 
important tasks, such as selecting good projects and making good investment decisions.  
The net result could be negative for shareholders.  See Core et al., supra note 105, at 
1162-63.   
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shareholders.137  If shareholders really felt that CEO pay was a 
material concern, one would expect that they would often reject 
option plans submitted for shareholder approval.  In fact, a 
study of shareholder voting on stock option plans during the 
1998 proxy season found that less than one percent failed to 
receive the approval of shareholders.138  One former SEC 
Commissioner put the materiality point forcefully as follows:   
The Chartered Financial Analysis Institute, representing more than 
70,000 money managers, investment advisers, and Chartered 
Financial Analysts (CFAs), teaches CFAs how to study a corporation 
and how to determine what matters and what does not matter in 
assessing the buy, sell, or hold decision.  It even teaches CFAs about 
the voting decisions and how, with professional confidence, to reach 
conclusions on which many will rely.  The CFA represents the best of 
the breed.  When and if they start to attribute telling importance to 
executive compensation arrangements in deciding what to 
recommend, this matter will become important to investors . . . .  
Until this time comes, the issue, by definition, lacks 
materiality . . . .139  
In sum, critics have opposed Bebchuk and Fried’s 
proposed solutions due to their concern that, once empowered, 
shareholders would either fail to use their new power, or would 
use it to the detriment of the corporation.  In any event, they 
argue, the costs associated with the reforms would likely 
outweigh the benefits. 
V. COMPENSATION REPRESENTATIVES: A PRUDENT 
APPROACH 
The controversy can now be summarized as follows:  
Bebchuk and Fried have pointed out numerous defects in the 
process for determining CEO pay, and have demonstrated how 
the process falls short of the ideal of the arm’s length 
negotiation.140  They have argued that the defects have led to 
excessive CEO pay, largely attenuated from CEO performance.  
  
 137 See Loewenstein, supra note 9, at 11 (referencing a study indicating that 
had the CEOs of the 1000 largest US corporations worked without compensation in 
1992, shareholder returns would have increased by only 0.06%). 
 138 Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, The Determinants of Shareholder 
Voting on Stock Option Plans, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 31, 58 (2000).  
 139 Longstreth, supra note 38, at 770-71.  But another explanation for CFAs’ 
apparent apathy is that, to the extent that the excessive compensation is endemic to 
publicly traded U.S. corporations, CEO pay is not material for determining relative 
returns.  If, however, CEO pay were to decline or to become better aligned with actual 
performance, material benefits would accrue, especially to the diversified investor.   
 140 See supra Part II.A. 
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To address the problem, they have suggested, among other 
things, making boards more responsive to shareholders by 
empowering shareholders (i) to specifically approve certain 
“suspect” forms of compensation, (ii) to nominate directors, and 
(iii) to initiate changes to the corporate charter.141  Critics have 
responded by arguing that CEO pay may not, in fact, be 
excessive, and that CEOs may simply be using their legitimate 
bargaining power to command high pay.142  They have justified 
mega option grants by noting that options are viewed by the 
corporation as inexpensive and by CEOs as risky.143  As for 
Bebchuk and Fried’s proposal to increase shareholder power, 
critics have argued, in effect, that the proposed cure is worse 
than the disease, especially since the amounts involved may 
not be material to investors.144   
A. Reconciling the Debate 
The arguments on both sides of this debate appear to 
have merit, but can they be reconciled?  To a certain degree, 
the answer is yes.  On the one hand, the recent increases in the 
compensation of highly talented persons generally, along with 
the demonstrated correlation between company size and CEO 
pay, do imply that not all of the rise in CEO compensation is 
attributable to managerial power.  Critics of Bebchuk and 
Fried also have a point when they argue that, as Vice 
Chancellor Strine put it, “the current American approach to 
corporate governance appears, on balance, to produce good 
results.”145  They are therefore right to be skeptical of 
significant changes to the balance of power between boards and 
shareholders, particularly while there is some question 
regarding the financial materiality of CEO pay to shareholders, 
the putative beneficiaries of reform.146  On the other hand, it is 
  
 141 See supra Part II.B.  For other proposed reforms, see, e.g., Charles M. 
Elson, Director Compensation and the Management-Captured Board – The History of a 
Symptom and a Cure, 50 SMU L. REV. 127 (proposing that all directors be paid only in 
stock of the relevant corporation); Holmstrom, supra note 119 (proposing the 
institution of generally accepted compensation practices, analogous to GAAP, which 
can be audited); Loewenstein, supra note 9 (proposing that shareholders be allowed an 
advisory up or down vote on CEO pay). 
 142  See supra Part III. 
 143  See supra notes 121-24 and accompanying text.   
 144 See supra Part IV. 
 145 Strine, supra note 127, at 1769. 
 146  This article does not take a position on whether allowing shareholders to 
nominate directors would be advisable to help address broader corporate governance 
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important to note that none of the critics have defended the 
existing pay-setting process, except by claiming that arm’s 
length negotiations by a divided and adversarial board could be 
even worse.147  Even a prominent critic of the managerial power 
thesis implicitly admitted that the process is seriously flawed 
when he made the following concession: 
Judgment calls tend systematically to favour the CEO.  Faced with a 
range of market data on competitive pay levels, committees tend to 
err on the high side.  Faced with a choice between a sensible 
compensation plan and a slightly inferior one favoured by the CEO, 
the committee will defer to management. . . .  The amounts at stake 
in any particular case are typically trivial from a shareholder’s 
perspective, but the overall impact of the bias has likely contributed 
to the ratcheting of pay levels [described in this article].148   
B. Adopting a System of Prudent Reform 
1. Characteristics of Prudent Reform 
What then should be done?  In view of the uncertainty 
regarding the extent of excessive pay, as well as the risks 
associated with adopting radical changes to corporate 
governance, reformers should strive to adopt a prudent 
approach that addresses the process problems without 
simultaneously creating new problems.  Prudent reform would 
have five distinct characteristics.  First, it would insert into the 
compensation-setting process parties who are immune to CEO 
pressure and responsive to shareholder concerns.  Second, it 
would address compensation process flaws in a targeted way, 
with minimal spill-over into other areas of corporate 
governance.  In other words, it would not fundamentally alter 
the existing balance between directors and shareholders, or 
jeopardize the collegiality of many well-functioning boards.  
Third, it would provide a substantial enough improvement over 
the existing system to justify its adoption.  It would further the 
interests of shareholders, while being mindful of the limits and 
possible disadvantages, discussed above, of direct shareholder 
involvement.  It would avoid imposing on shareholders 
demands that exceed their expertise or costs that exceed 
  
concerns.  It simply argues that shareholder nominations may constitute too strong a 
remedy if the primary concern is executive compensation. 
 147  See supra note 119 and accompanying text.  
 148 Kevin J. Murphy, Executive Compensation, in HANDBOOK OF LABOR 
ECONOMICS 2485, 2518 (Orley Ashenfelter & David Card eds., 1999).   
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expected benefits, and it would involve shareholders only to the 
extent likely to promote the long-term interests of the 
corporation.  Fourth, prudent reform would be achievable with 
minimal changes to existing law, a particularly important 
characteristic since one could expect that powerful members of 
the business lobbying community would strongly resist 
significant legal changes that might be viewed as impinging on 
power of directors or threatening the pay of CEOs.149  Finally, 
prudent reform would be flexible.  Rather than requiring 
significant changes to all firms, irrespective of individual 
circumstances, it would allow arrangements to be tried in the 
marketplace and vindicated or discredited by the market 
itself.150 
2. The “Compensation Representative”  
Bearing in mind the foregoing principles for prudent 
reform, this article proposes that shareholders of those 
corporations with excessive CEO pay should amend corporate 
bylaws to create a special non-executive position, tentatively 
entitled “compensation representative,” to represent the 
interests of shareholders with respect to CEO compensation.  
The amended bylaw could provide that the three largest 
eligible shareholders of the corporation, acting by consensus, 
would appoint the compensation representative.  If they are 
unable to agree on a candidate, they may submit the decision to 
a neutral arbitrator of their choosing.  In order to be eligible to 
participate in the appointment of the compensation 
representative, a large shareholder must: (i) have held its 
shares for at least one year; and (ii) not have material business 
  
 149 A case in point is provided by the modest reforms that the SEC proposed in 
2003 in order to enhance shareholder nomination rights in limited circumstances.  See 
Security Holder Director Nominations, 68 Fed. Reg. 60784 (Oct. 23, 2003) (codified at 
17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249, 274).  The negative reaction by the Business Roundtable and 
other lobbying organizations was decisive.   According to the SEC staff, “The vast 
majority of commentators supported modifying the proxy rules and regulations related 
to the nomination and election of directors.  Commentators who did not support such a 
modification included all of the corporations and corporate executives, most of the legal 
community, and the majority of associations (mostly business associations).”  SEC Div. 
of Corp. Fin., Staff Report: Review of the Proxy Process Regarding the Nomination and 
Election of Directors (July 15, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/ 
proxyrpt.htm.  The reforms were ultimately not adopted. 
 150 Prudent reform would not set a ceiling on CEO pay, whether in absolute 
terms or as a multiple of worker salaries.  If, as some commentators claim, high CEO 
pay results from the limited supply of exceptional CEOs and their legitimate use of the 
resulting bargaining power, a corporation should not be restricted from awarding 
appropriately high compensation. 
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dealings with the company, other than in its capacity as a 
shareholder.  Finally, to help guard against opportunistic 
behavior, both the appointing shareholders and the 
compensation representative would be required to sign an 
agreement with the company requiring them to fulfil their 
duties under the system in the interests of the shareholders as 
a whole.151  
a. Rights and Duties of the Compensation 
Representative 
Compensation representatives would not have the right 
to vote either as members of the compensation committee or 
the board of directors.  They would not be authorized to 
manage the business or affairs of the corporation.  Their rights 
and duties would instead be limited to the following: (i) to 
attend all compensation committee meetings (formal or 
informal), as well as all board of director meetings, to the 
extent such board meetings concern CEO compensation 
matters; (ii) to inspect all documents relating to CEO 
compensation; (iii) to demand compensation-related 
information from compensation committee members, 
compensation consultants, and other board members; (iv) to 
advise and give opinions on CEO compensation matters, 
including its form, amount, conditions for receipt, and timing; 
(v) to submit to compensation committees any objections to 
proposed compensation plans, and, in the event that the full 
board participates in the determination of CEO compensation, 
to submit objections to the full board; and (vi) finally, if 
unsatisfied with the response of compensation committees or 
boards, as the case may be, to submit objections to the 
shareholders that appointed them.  Following receipt of a 
compensation representative’s objections, an appointing 
shareholder could take any action thereon which it saw fit.  For 
example, one or more of the appointing shareholders could 
meet with members of the compensation committee to learn 
more about the reasons for the proposed compensation package 
and to discuss ways in which it might be improved.  In extreme 
cases, as discussed below, an objecting shareholder could force 
the corporation to include in its proxy a proposal to reject any 
  
 151  For a discussion of other protections against possible conflicts of interest 
between appointing shareholders and other shareholders of the corporation, see infra 
notes 158-60 and accompanying text.      
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portions of the compensation package submitted for 
shareholder approval.  It could also force the corporation to 
include in the proxy pay-related precatory proposals, in which 
the shareholders formally recommend that the board take 
certain actions without purporting to require that the board do 
so.152   
b. Advantages of a Compensation Representative 
System 
There are numerous advantages to the compensation 
representative system over either the current system or the 
reforms proposed by Bebchuk and Fried.  First and foremost, 
the use of a compensation representative would address the 
most serious process problem raised by Bebchuk and Fried—
the current failure of boards to adequately represent the 
interests of shareholders.  It would insert into the 
compensation process a party who is beholden not to the CEO, 
but to the shareholders.  Since the compensation 
representative would not be nominated or appointed by the 
board or CEO, he or she would be less susceptible to 
managerial power than are directors under the current system.  
Moreover, the large shareholders that appointed the 
compensation representative would have a sufficient stake in 
the corporation to ensure that the representative would be 
accountable to the shareholders; and representatives who wish 
to be repeat players would have a strong incentive to develop a 
reputation for protecting shareholder interests.   
The compensation representative proposal is preferable 
to Bebchuk and Fried’s proposals, since it is a targeted 
response to the specific problem of CEO compensation.  Its 
effects would not spill over into other matters, since the role of 
a compensation representative would be limited to 
investigating and advising on compensation matters, and 
would not extend to the management of the corporation’s 
affairs.  This limited role ensures that the use of a 
compensation representative would not substantially alter the 
traditional balance of power between a corporation’s board and 
its shareholders.153  It also would enable a compensation 
  
 152 See infra notes 166-88 and accompanying text. 
 153 Presumably, Bebchuk for one would not view this limited role as a virtue, 
since he feels that granting shareholders greater rights would benefit corporate 
governance more generally.  See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing 
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representative, who would not be a board member, to be tough 
with the CEO without sacrificing board collegiality.  The 
representative could serve as the “bad guy,” making it easier 
for the board to take a harder line with the CEO.  Rather than 
telling the CEO, “Bob, we don’t think you’re worth that much,” 
a board with a compensation representative could say, “Bob, 
we’d love to grant you the additional one hundred thousand 
options—and we really think you deserve it—but if we do, that 
S.O.B. is going to make a big stink about it, and the publicity 
would be bad for all of us.”   
One might argue that a compensation representative 
provides no improvement on the current system.  After all, 
shareholders are already entitled to vote on significant portions 
of most compensation packages.154  However, a system that 
merely allows shareholders the right to reject an inappropriate 
proposal is clearly inferior to one that could prevent the board 
from submitting the inappropriate proposal in the first place.  
A compensation representative could become engaged in the 
details of the compensation package early in the process.  He or 
she would be in a position to detect manipulation, excess, or 
potential CEO windfalls from the outset, before the 
compensation committee or the board presents its 
recommendation to the shareholders.  Take an example in 
which a huge bonus is conditioned upon the CEO’s 
achievement of certain objective goals.  A diligent 
compensation representative would be better able than 
shareholders to judge whether the goals could be achieved 
easily or only through extraordinary CEO performance.  He or 
she could encourage the compensation committee to adopt 
demanding goals and could otherwise influence the details of 
the package to ensure the alignment of pay with performance, 
all prior to the shareholder vote.  Furthermore, a compensation 
representative certainly would be better able than 
shareholders to detect and object to egregious practices such as 
the backdating of option grants. 
Another advantage to a compensation representative 
system is that compensation representatives would likely 
become repeat players, working with more companies than 
  
Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833, 865-70 (2005) (arguing that shareholder 
value would be increased if shareholders were allowed to initiate changes in the 
corporate charter, to nominate board members, to change the company’s state of 
incorporation, and to initiate mergers and similar transactions).  
 154 See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.  
2007] COMPENSATION REPRESENTATIVES 477 
even the most active and sought after board member.  Over 
time, they could develop expertise, market knowledge, and 
insight into the proper design of compensation packages, as 
well as into the way such packages can be manipulated.  Thus, 
compensation representatives could not only benefit the 
shareholders, but they could also educate the compensation 
committee and board of directors on compensation best 
practices, thereby alleviating another problem identified by 
Bebchuk and Fried, the limits on the time and information 
available to independent directors.155   
The early involvement of a compensation representative 
would also benefit shareholders in those (hopefully rare) 
instances where the inclusion of a shareholder proxy proposal 
became necessary.  Currently, as mentioned above, when 
shareholders vote on a compensation scheme, they are not 
generally provided with an alternative to the board’s proposal, 
and may therefore feel compelled to approve inappropriate 
arrangements.156  If, however, a shareholder were to respond to 
the compensation representative’s objections by including a 
proxy proposal under Rule 14a-8 of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934, the shareholder would have 500 words in which to 
state not only its objection to the board’s proposal, but the 
material terms of the recommended alternative pay 
arrangement, thereby providing a real alternative to the 
board’s proposal.157  Regardless of whether the general 
shareholders ultimately accepted the shareholder proposal, its 
very inclusion in the proxy could encourage directors to be 
more transparent regarding executive pay, since they would 
need to clearly justify their proposed arrangements in response 
to the specific objections set forth in the shareholder proposal.  
What about the potential dissention and conflict among 
participating shareholders?  Since neither the compensation 
representative nor the appointing shareholders would be 
engaged in the management of the corporation, the likelihood 
of significant conflict among shareholders would be small.  All 
shareholders would benefit proportionally if a compensation 
representative either lowered CEO pay, enhanced CEO 
performance, or both.158  However, if a conflict were to arise 
  
 155 PWP, supra note 4, at 36-37. 
 156 See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
 157 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c), (d) (2005).  For details regarding the use of Rule 
14a-8, see infra notes 166-74 and accompanying text. 
 158 Anabtawi, supra note 128, at 593. 
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between long and short term shareholders, the proposal set 
forth in this article specifically favors long term shareholders, 
since only shareholders who have held their shares for at least 
one year could participate in the appointment of the 
compensation representative.  Likewise, conflicts between 
insiders and outsiders would be resolved in favor of outsiders, 
since shareholders with material business dealings with the 
corporation could not participate in the appointment of the 
compensation representative.159   
What if a shareholder wished to use the compensation 
representative to sabotage the corporation for private gain?  
Imagine, for example, that Company S, the largest shareholder 
of Company A, owns one percent of Company A, as well as 
twenty percent of Company B, a competitor of A.  What if 
Company S tried to appoint an unduly aggressive and 
confrontational compensation representative in order to force 
the CEO of A to resign, to the detriment of Company S’s 
investment in Company A, but to the much larger benefit of its 
investment in Company B?  Or imagine scenario two, in which 
Company S tried to use the compensation representative to 
force Company A to acquire Company B at an excessive price, 
enabling Company S to capture a large premium on its 
investment in Company B sufficient to offset the loss on its 
smaller investment in Company A?  Finally, imagine scenario 
three, in which Company S, a large financial institution, 
manages Company A’s very profitable pension program.  What 
if Company S hesitated to appoint a hard-nosed compensation 
representative, for fear of jeopardizing its relationship with the 
CEO of Company A? 
The proposal set forth in this article presents significant 
hurdles to all three scenarios.  As to scenario one, even if a 
shareholder wanted to use the compensation representative to 
force the resignation of a valuable CEO, it could not likely 
convince the other two appointing shareholders to appoint such 
a representative.  If a bad faith compensation representative 
threatened to contest the board’s compensation proposal unless 
his or her demands were met, the threats would ring hollow, 
  
 159 See Parthiban David et al., The Effect of Institutional Investors on the Level 
and Mix of CEO Compensation, 41 ACAD. MGMT. J. 200, 205 (1998) (an empirical study 
indicating that institutional investors that have merely an investment relationship 
with the firm influence compensation in accordance with shareholder preferences, but 
that institutional shareholders that depend on the firm for their own business have no 
such influence).  
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since unreasonable proxy proposals would likely be rejected by 
the full shareholder vote.160  A shareholder’s attempt to effect 
scenario two would be subject to the same difficulties as 
scenario one.  In addition, the shareholder in scenario two 
would be stymied by the fact that a compensation 
representative cannot engage in the management of the 
corporation, making it difficult for the representative to 
pressure the corporation to take specific actions, such as a 
merger.  Finally, as for scenario three, the use of a lap-dog 
compensation representative would be no worse than the 
current system, in which the board makes its decision without 
the input of any shareholder representative.  In any event, the 
precise scenario described could not occur, since shareholders 
with significant commercial dealings with the corporation 
would be excluded from the appointment process.  
c. A Compensation Representative System is 
Feasible Under Existing Law 
Assuming that the proposal set forth in this article 
would, if implemented, benefit shareholders, is it feasible 
under existing law?  Very much so.  In fact, as described below, 
it could be implemented in Delaware without the active 
involvement of courts, legislatures, or, perhaps most 
importantly, company boards.161  Under existing Delaware 
corporate law, a company’s bylaws would simply need to be 
amended to grant the three eligible shareholders the right to 
appoint a compensation representative having the rights and 
duties described above.  In Delaware, this bylaw amendment 
could be effected by either the board of directors or the 
shareholders.  Under Section 109(a) of the Delaware General 
Corporation Law, the power to adopt, amend, or repeal the 
bylaws is held by the shareholders, provided that the certificate 
of incorporation may confer such power on the board.162  But 
“[t]he fact that such power has been so conferred upon the 
  
 160 Rule 14a-8 would allow Company S to include the same compensation-
related proxy proposals whether or not the company has a compensation 
representative.  The participation of a bad faith compensation representative would 
add little to the threat posed to the CEO from such a proposal. 
 161 In this sense, the proposal set forth in this article differs from Bebchuk and 
Fried’s proposal to force companies to pay the costs for board proxy contests that 
receive sufficient support.  Under current law, all such costs must be borne by the 
contesting shareholders.  
 162 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a) (2001). 
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directors or governing body, as the case may be, shall not divest 
the stockholders or members of the power, nor limit their 
power to adopt, amend or repeal bylaws.”163  The Revised Model 
Business Corporation Act provides both boards and 
shareholders with similar rights to amend bylaws.164  Under 
the reasonable assumption that most boards would not 
unilaterally propose such a bylaw amendment, shareholders 
who meet certain rather easy eligibility requirements165 may, 
under SEC Rule 14a-8 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
compel the corporation to include it in its proxy.166   
Rule 14a-8(i) provides, however, that a company may 
exclude a proposal from its proxy “[i]f the proposal is not a 
proper subject for action by shareholders under the laws of the 
jurisdiction of the company’s organization.”167  Recently, 
Professor Bebchuk has attempted to use Rule 14a-8 to propose 
that CA, Inc. (formerly Computer Associates International, 
Inc.) amend its bylaws to limit the board’s ability to issue 
poison pills.168  Such proposals, however, are subject to the 
objection that they conflict with Section 141(a) of the Delaware 
General Corporation Law, which provides: “The business and 
affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall 
be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors, 
except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its 
certificate of incorporation.”169  Indeed, the conflict with Section 
141(a) was the stated reason that the board of CA, Inc. refused 
to include the proposal in its proxy.  Neither the SEC nor the 
  
 163 Id. 
 164   Article 10.20(a) of the RMBCA provides that “[a] corporation’s 
shareholders may amend or repeal the corporation’s bylaws.”  Article 10.20(b) permits 
the board of directors to amend or repeal the bylaws as well, but gives shareholders the 
final word, since the board may not amend or repeal bylaws if “the shareholders in 
amending, repealing, or adopting a bylaw provide that the board of directors may not 
amend, repeal, or reinstate that bylaw.  See REVISED MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT 
§ 10.20(b)(2) (2003). 
 165  Under Rule 14a-8(b), in order to be eligible to submit a proposal, a 
shareholder must have continuously held at least $2,000 in market value, or 1%, of the 
company's securities entitled to be voted on the proposal at the meeting for at least one 
year by the date the shareholder submits the proposal, and must continue to hold those 
securities through the date of the meeting. 
 166 SEC v. Transamerica, 163 F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1947).   
 167 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i) (2006).  
 168  See Bebchuk v. CA, Inc., 902 A.2d 737, 738 (Del. Ch. 2006).  
 169 For a discussion of the conflict under the corporate law of Delaware and 
other states between corporate law provisions granting shareholders the right to pass 
and amend bylaws and those granting the board of directors the power to manage the 
affairs of the corporation, see generally Brett H. McDonnell, Shareholder Bylaws, 
Shareholder Nominations, and Poison Pills, 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 205 (2005).  
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Delaware courts have expressed an opinion on the merits of the 
board’s refusal; the former refusing to grant a no-action letter 
pending the resolution of the matter under Delaware law,170 
and the latter refusing to decide the matter on ripeness 
grounds.171  The Oklahoma Supreme Court, however, when 
interpreting provisions of its corporate code which are 
substantially identical to those of Delaware, held in a similar 
case that the shareholders may propose a bylaw to require 
shareholder approval for the issuance of poison pills.172   
In any event, an adverse ruling on Bebchuk’s CA, Inc. 
proposal would not seem to cast doubt on the legality under 
Delaware law of a compensation representative bylaw, since 
the two bylaws could be clearly distinguished.  Delaware 
General Corporation Law provides that bylaws “may contain 
any provision, not inconsistent with law or with the certificate 
of incorporation, relating to the business of the corporation, the 
conduct of its affairs, and its rights or powers or the rights or 
powers of its stockholders, directors, officers or employees.”173  
Unlike Bebchuk’s proposed bylaw, a bylaw merely calling for 
the appointment of a compensation representative could not be 
said to conflict with Section 141(a), since the representative 
would be explicitly precluded from managing the business or 
affairs of the corporation.  Neither would the bylaw conflict 
with articles of incorporation that explicitly grant the 
compensation committee or the board of directors the authority 
to determine officer and director compensation.  After all, the 
compensation representative would not be a member of either 
the compensation committee or the board, nor would he or she 
have the authority to vote on the actual compensation being 
proposed.  He or she would merely represent the interests of 
shareholders and call to their attention compensation plans 
that shareholders might find objectionable.  The legality of a 
bylaw calling for a compensation representative is further 
strengthened by Section 141(h), which permits corporations to 
use bylaws to restrict the compensation of directors.174  
  
 170 Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, SEC No-Action Letter, 2006 WL 1547985, at *1 
(June 5, 2006). 
 171 Bebchuk, 902 A.2d at 737. 
 172 See Int’l Bd. of Teamsters Gen. Fund v. Fleming Co., 975 P.2d 907, 908 
(Okla. 1999). 
 173 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b) (2001). 
 174 “Unless otherwise restricted by the certificate of incorporation or bylaws, the 
board of directors shall have the authority to fix the compensation of directors.”  Id. 
§ 141(h) (emphasis added). 
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Another possible hurdle to the use of bylaws to adopt 
compensation representatives might be found in Rule14a-
8(i)(8), which allows companies to exclude from the proxy a 
proposal which relates to an election to “the board of directors 
or analogous governing body.”  Apart from the obvious fact that 
a compensation representative is not a board member and does 
not otherwise have the right to govern the affairs of the 
company, the ability of companies to use  Rule 18a-8(i)(8) to 
exclude shareholder proposals has been weakened by the 
recent Second Circuit holding in American Federation of State, 
County & Municipal Employees v. American International 
Group, Inc.175  The court held that a shareholder proposal to 
require that AIG include certain shareholder board nominees 
on the corporate ballot under Rule 14a-8 could not be excluded 
from the corporate proxy materials.176  The court rejected the 
SEC’s interpretation of its own rule, holding that, although 
Rule 14a-8(j)(8) would allow a corporation to exclude specific 
nominees from an election, it would not allow it to exclude a 
bylaw proposal to permit shareholder nominees to be included 
on the corporate ballot in the future.177  A fortiori, a company 
should not be able under Rule 14a-8(i)(8) to exclude a 
resolution relating to a mere compensation representative.  
Once the bylaw has been approved by the shareholders, 
no further legal issues should arise unless and until a 
compensation representative objects to the board’s 
compensation plan and a shareholder submits a proxy proposal 
calling on the shareholders to reject it.  If the proxy proposal 
concerns a portion of the plan that is subject to a shareholder 
approval, there should be no legal hurdles to the proxy 
proposal, since the proposing shareholder would simply be 
exercising its right under the securities law.  Thus, for 
example, a shareholder could include a proxy proposal to reject 
an equity-based compensation plan, since the listing rules of 
both the New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ require that 
the shareholders approve any such plan.178  Similarly, a 
shareholder could include a proxy proposal regarding any 
individual’s compensation in excess of $1 million for which the 
  
 175  Am. Fed’n of State, County, & Mun. Employees v. Am. Int’l. Group, Inc., 
462 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 176 Id. at 123. 
 177 Id. at 127. 
 178  See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text. 
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corporation wished to claim a deduction under § 162 (m) of the 
Internal Revenue Code.179    
More problematic would be a shareholder proxy 
proposal that purported either (i) to reject other portions of a 
compensation plan for which neither the tax law nor the 
exchange rules requires a shareholder vote, or (ii) to compel the 
corporation to adopt a specific compensation plan that had not 
already been proposed by the board.  Whether or not a 
corporation could exclude such proxy proposals would depend 
upon state corporate law since, as discussed above, Rule 14a-8 
allows a corporation to exclude any proposal that is invalid 
under the law of the corporation’s jurisdiction of organization.180 
Therefore, the legality of a proposal to reject, for 
example, cash compensation under $1 million would depend in 
Delaware on whether the corporate charter or bylaws 
permitted the shareholders to approve officer and director 
compensation in such a case.  Certainly, a corporation could 
amend its charter to require such a vote.  Under Delaware law, 
however, any charter amendment must be first initiated by the 
board, following which the shareholders must approve it.181  It 
seems unlikely that many boards would unilaterally initiate 
charter amendments that subject their compensation decisions 
to a shareholder vote.  As for bylaw amendments, their terms 
are generally subordinate to contrary provisions in the 
charter.182  Thus, a shareholder could probably only initiate a 
bylaw amendment to require a shareholder vote on executive 
compensation if the charter contained no contrary provision.183  
The same problem would confront a proxy proposal 
purporting to compel the board to adopt a compensation plan 
containing specific terms.  Such a proposal would not be valid 
unless a provision of the charter or bylaws actually granted 
shareholders the right to dictate executive compensation, as 
opposed to simply granting them the right to approve a plan 
proposed by the board.  Presumably such a provision would be 
rare, certainly among listed companies, all of which are 
required under exchange rules to appoint compensation 
  
 179 See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text. 
 180  See supra note 167 and accompanying text. 
 181 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b) (2001). 
 182 See, e.g., Gaskill v. Gladys Belle Oil Co., 146 A. 337, 340 (Del. Ch. 1929). 
 183 But, in view of the potential conflict of interest, it is not inconceivable that 
a court in equity could give preference to the bylaws.  See Gow v. Consol. Coppermines 
Corp., 165 A. 136, 138-42 (Del. Ch. 1933) (holding that a bylaw determining the 
number of directors prevails over a contrary clause in the charter). 
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committees satisfying criteria specified by the relevant 
exchange.184   
Although a corporation could exclude a proxy proposal 
to reject certain portions of a pay package or to compel the 
board to adopt a particular compensation plan, a shareholder 
could still require the company to include a non-binding, or 
“precatory” proxy proposal.185  Some may be skeptical of the 
effectiveness of precatory proposals, since they have tended not 
to garner significant shareholder support.  A study of such 
proposals in the 1994 proxy season conducted by Randall 
Thomas and Kenneth Martin found that precatory proposals 
relating to compensation garnered, on average, support of only 
12.8%.186  However, precatory proposals submitted on the 
recommendation of the compensation representative should 
have greater credibility among shareholders than have past 
precatory proposals, which were often made by shareholders, 
such as unions or governmental actors, who held non-financial 
objectives.  Another empirical study by the same authors 
relating to the 1993-1997 proxy seasons found that 
“shareholders are statistically more likely to support executive 
compensation proposals that raise corporate governance issues 
than those that raise social responsibility issues.”187  Still, one 
might wonder whether, if a precatory proposal were to pass, 
the board would act on it, since it has no legal obligation to do 
so.  Yet Thomas and Martin’s study found that in the two-year 
period following the inclusion of compensation-related 
precatory proposals, total compensation declined by a 
statistically significant average of $2.7 million, although not a 
single proposal they studied actually passed.188  One can expect 
  
 184 See, e.g., NYSE Listed Company Manual Rule 303A.05(a), http://www.nyse. 
com/lcm (follow the “Click here to open the NYSE Listed Company Manual” hyperlink, 
the “Section” hyperlink, the “Section 3 Corporate Responsibility” hyperlink, the 
“Section 303A Corporate Governance Standards” hyperlink, and the “Section 303A.05 
Compensation Committee” hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 8, 2006). 
 185 Since precatory proposals are not binding on the board, they are not 
deemed by the SEC to conflict with the requirement that the board have the authority 
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Adoption of Amendments Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, Exchange Act 
Release No. 12,999, 41 Fed. Reg. 52,994, at *7 (Dec. 3, 1976).  
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a precatory proposal submitted following the report of a 
compensation representative to be at least as effective.  Indeed, 
such a precatory proposal, even if it does not pass, should be 
more effective than those studied by Thomas and Martin, since 
the board would realize that the proposal had the support of at 
least one major shareholder.  If such a precatory proposal were 
to pass, one could expect the impact to be even greater, 
especially if the precatory proposal were to be accompanied by 
the shareholders’ actual rejection of those portions of the 
compensation plan submitted for their approval.  In the face of 
such a rejection, a board would ignore the precatory proposal at 
its peril. 
d. Flexibility of Compensation Representative 
System  
As discussed above, one advantage of implementing the 
compensation representative system by bylaw is that it would 
obviate the need for new legislation.189  A related advantage to 
case-by-case implementation is flexibility, especially since the 
extent of the CEO compensation problem may vary greatly by 
firm.190  For example, at some firms, such as those controlled by 
a large independent shareholder, executive compensation may 
not be a serious issue, and the controlling shareholder may 
have the means and motivation to monitor executive 
compensation better than could a compensation representative.  
Indeed, empirical studies have indicated that firms with a 
shareholder controlling more than five percent of the shares 
may already be engaged in significant monitoring,191 and that 
  
 189  See supra note 161 and accompanying text. 
 190 For evidence that flexibility in matters of corporate governance improves 
company performance, see Sridhar R. Arcot & Valentina G. Bruno, One Size Does Not 
Fit All, After All: Evidence from Corporate Governance (May 16, 2006) (unpublished 
working paper), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=887947 (an empirical study 
finding that rigid adherence to “best practices” does not necessarily lead to superior 
performance, due to the heterogeneity of circumstances facing different companies).  
See also Stephen M. Bainbridge, A Critique of the NYSE’s Director Independence 
Listing Standards, 30 SEC. REG. L.J. 370 (2002) (arguing that independent directors 
are not an unalloyed good, in part because different companies may require different 
accountability mechanisms). 
 191 See, e.g., David et al., supra note 159 (finding that the presence of 
institutional owners without significant business ties to a company is associated with 
lower levels of CEO pay); Donald C. Hambrick & Sydney Finkelstein, The Effects of 
Ownership Structure on Conditions at the Top: The Case of CEO Pay Raises, 16 
STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 175 (1995) (finding that the pay of CEOs at firms containing a 
large outside shareholder was tied significantly more strongly to profitability than was 
the case at firms without such a shareholder). 
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the doubling of the percentage holdings of large outside 
shareholdings is associated with a twelve to fourteen percent 
drop in CEO pay.192  Shareholders of such a firm might see no 
benefit to adding an additional layer of bureaucracy on top of 
an already well-working system.193  
On the other hand, shareholders of an underperforming 
firm that is dominated not by an outside shareholder, but by an 
unresponsive CEO and his or her complicit board of directors, 
may find that the executive compensation system lies at the 
heart of the company’s problems.  They may discover that the 
introduction of a compensation representative both captures 
the attention and increases the accountability of the CEO and 
the board, to the substantial benefit of shareholders.  
In short, rather than mandating a procrustean system 
that could lead to unforeseen negative effects, the proposal set 
forth in this article would give shareholders, the intended 
beneficiaries of the new system, the ability to determine for 
themselves whether its adoption addresses their concerns.  If it 
does, the system will likely be adopted by numerous 
corporations, and may evolve into corporate best practice.  
Indeed, if it became widely adopted, its benefits could 
subsequently be reflected in law.  For example, courts could 
adopt a different standard of review of executive compensation 
depending upon whether a compensation representative was 
involved.  Compensation plans involving a compensation 
representative could continue to enjoy the deferential waste 
standard or could be entirely immunized from judicial review, 
while plans adopted without such involvement could be 
subjected to a stricter scrutiny.  Alternatively, state corporate 
law could be amended to provide for compensation 
representatives in all cases, unless a company’s articles of 
incorporation explicitly opted-out of the system.194  If, on the 
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other hand, the use of compensation representatives provided 
no material shareholder benefit, additional corporations could 
refrain from adopting it, and those which had adopted it could 
repeal it by a simple shareholder vote, without the need for 
legislative or judicial action. 
VI. RESPONSES TO POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS 
This article concludes by addressing a few possible 
objections to the compensation representative proposal.  One 
objection might be that another layer of corporate bureaucracy 
is unnecessary, since most companies already have a 
compensation committee, along with a compensation 
consultant, to advise them.  But as pointed out by Graef 
Crystal, a compensation consultant and long-time critic of 
executive pay, the presence of a compensation consultant is no 
panacea.195  Quite the contrary:  
Ostensibly, compensation consultants were hired by the CEO to 
perform an objective analysis of the company’s executive pay 
package and to make whatever recommendations the consultant felt 
were appropriate.  In reality, if those recommendations did not cause 
the CEO to earn more money than he was earning before the 
compensation consultant appeared on the scene, the latter was 
rapidly shown the door.  I learned this fact of life early on . . . .196   
One might argue that Crystal’s description no longer 
applies, since the listing rules of the New York Stock Exchange 
now require companies listed thereon to: (i) have a 
compensation committee “composed entirely of independent 
directors;” and (ii) have a written charter that gives the 
compensation committee “sole authority to retain and 
terminate” any compensation consultant employed by the 
company.197  The mere fact, however, that a member of the 
compensation committee is independent for purposes of the 
exchange listing rules does not address another major problem 
with compensation consultants: the possibility of other, much 
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larger contracts between the consultant and the company.  
These contracts would be managed by the company’s human 
resources department, under the control of the CEO rather 
than the compensation committee.  Consultants would likely be 
very chary of jeopardizing these contracts by taking a tough 
line on CEO pay.  Hewitt Associates, a compensation 
consultant for Verizon Communications, provides a real-life 
example of the problem.  In its role as compensation 
consultant, it reports to the compensation committee of the 
board.  However, in its other consulting roles, it reports 
through the corporate hierarchy, and ultimately to the Verizon 
CEO.  In 2005 it assisted the compensation committee in 
devising a CEO pay package worth $19.4 million, a forty-eight 
percent increase over that of 2004.198  Without passing 
judgment on whether such an increase was justified, in view of 
the twenty-six percent decline in Verizon stock over the same 
period, the fact that, since 1997, Hewitt Associates has received 
more than half a billion dollars in consulting revenue from 
Verizon and its predecessor companies does call into question 
its independence.199  One suspects that a compensation 
representative appointed by the major shareholders might 
have viewed such a pay package differently than either the 
compensation committee or its compensation consultant did.  
Other skeptics of compensation representatives might 
contend that it is unfair to give the three largest eligible 
shareholders a right not available to the other shareholders, 
that is, the right to appoint the representative.  The large 
shareholders, however, would be entitled to appoint the 
representative only if the majority of the shares voted to grant 
them that right.  There is no obvious reason to paternalistically 
deny shareholders the right to vote in line with their perceived 
best interests, especially since, as stated above, Delaware law 
allows the bylaws to contain any provision relating to the 
affairs of the corporation as long as the provision is not 
contrary to law or the company’s certificate of incorporation.200   
In any event, there is a practical reason to place the 
right to appoint the representative in the hands of large 
shareholders; namely, there is no good alternative.  Even if the 
representative were appointed by a vote of all the shareholders, 
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 200 See supra note 173 and accompanying text. 
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someone would first have to nominate the candidate.  Giving 
the nomination right to the board would defeat the purpose of 
employing a compensation representative, since the 
representative would then be neither more nor less accountable 
to the shareholders than are other board members, who are 
also nominated by the board and elected by the shareholders.  
If every shareholder, regardless of the size of its holdings, were 
permitted to nominate a candidate, shareholders with only a 
small economic stake in the corporation might abuse the 
compensation representative to further their own political or 
other non-financial agenda.  If only those shareholders who 
held, say, five percent of the outstanding shares were allowed 
to nominate, compensation representatives could never be 
nominated for companies which did not have any large 
shareholders—precisely the sort of companies in which, as 
discussed above, a compensation representative could be most 
useful.  Also, if there were multiple five percent shareholders 
who each nominated competing candidates, smaller 
shareholders would have difficulty making an informed 
decision among them.  
One possible solution to this problem would be to permit 
the three largest eligible shareholders jointly to nominate a 
single candidate, subject to the approval of the shareholders.  
But since the purpose of adopting the compensation 
representative system would be to ensure the appointment of a 
party independent of the board of directors, the board could not 
be allowed to nominate an alternative.  As a result, the 
shareholder vote would devolve into the empty formality of 
electing a candidate without opposition.  Having said that, if 
shareholders wanted to include a voting procedure into the 
bylaw adopting compensation representatives, there is no 
obvious policy reason (other than a desire for simplicity) to 
prohibit it.  
Other skeptics might argue that, although a bylaw 
implementing a compensation representative system can be 
adopted by a mere shareholder vote, in fact, shareholders will 
not approve proxy resolutions opposed by management.  After 
all, it may be contended, large shareholders vote 
overwhelmingly with management.201  Pension funds may 
support management, in part at least, in order to secure 
  
 201  This concern was part of the motivation behind the SEC’s decision in 2003 
to require mutual funds and investment advisors to disclose their actual proxy votes.  
See 17 C.F.R. §§ 239, 249, 270, and 274 (2003). 
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business with the company.202  Other large investors may be 
motivated by a desire to gain privileged access to information.203  
Neither type of investor, it might be argued, would likely 
sacrifice these benefits for the sake of a compensation 
representative system.  However, substantial shareholder 
benefit can be achieved even if only a small percentage of 
companies actually adopt the bylaw, particularly if, as one 
might expect, the adopting companies are the very ones with 
the most egregious pay arrangements.204  Not only would the 
bylaw help to rectify pay practices at the most objectionable 
companies, but it might have an in terrorem effect, encouraging 
CEOs at other companies to moderate their own pay demands.   
Finally, some might suspect that, even if the bylaw were 
to pass, large shareholders would not be willing to participate 
in the compensation representative system, since the costs to 
such shareholders would exceed the benefits.  The total costs to 
participating shareholders, however, would be trivial.  Out-of-
pocket costs would be close to zero, since fees for the 
compensation representative would be paid by the corporation.  
Likewise, the costs of searching for an appropriate 
representative should be quite low, particularly for 
institutional shareholders that repeatedly appoint the same 
representatives for the various corporations in their portfolio.  
Costs in time and effort should also be low, since the actual 
tasks relating to reviewing, discussing, and, if necessary, 
amending the compensation plans would be delegated to the 
compensation representative.  The only significant task 
required of participating shareholders would be to respond in 
those limited instances in which a compensation representative 
has objected to the board’s final compensation determination.  
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VII. CONCLUSION 
Given the low costs to participating shareholders, even 
modest benefits would be sufficient to justify the use of 
compensation representatives.  In fact, the potential benefits to 
shareholders could be significant.  First, compensation 
representatives would provide a means of objectively 
evaluating whether a CEO’s pay is excessive.  When they find 
that a pay package is inappropriate, compensation 
representatives could suggest improvements to the package 
before it is even submitted to the board.  Thus, they would be 
more efficacious than the newly mandated disclosure rules, 
which merely require corporations to better inform 
shareholders about a fait accompli.  Second, if the use of a 
compensation representative led to lower CEO pay at a given 
company, one could expect the pay of other high-ranking 
executives at the company to decrease proportionally—hardly a 
trivial consideration when the top five executives are receiving 
9.8% of all corporate earnings.205  Third, oversight by 
compensation representatives could improve the alignment 
between executive pay and performance, thereby potentially 
enhancing shareholder returns by reducing agency costs.  
Fourth, even if compensation representatives brought only 
minor benefits for any individual company, they could, if widely 
employed, provide substantial benefits to diversified 
institutional investors, which could enjoy lower executive pay 
and better alignment between pay and performance for each 
company in their portfolios.  Finally, compensation 
representatives could have a substantial prophylactic benefit 
for investors.  At a bare minimum, they could help put an end 
to the “ratcheting effect” by which CEO pay might otherwise 
continue indefinitely to increase without obstruction.  This 
possibility alone should be enough to encourage investors to 
consider introducing compensation representatives, a prudent 
solution to excessive CEO pay. 
  
 205 See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 7. 
